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ABSTRACT Studies in animals have implicated the amygdala in 
social and emotional information processing. Within the past 
decade, the role of this structure has also been investigated in 
hwnans, using a variety of techniques. Perhaps best explored is its 
function in social judgments about facial expressions, the focus 
of this review. Lesion studies, electrophysiology, and functional 
imaging have all been brought to bear on this topic, and these 
approaches have begun to sketch the processes whereby the anlyg-
dala links perceptual representations of emotional sensory stimuli 
with the elicitation of behavioral and cognitive responses. These 
responses, in turn, both guide social behavior and generate social 
knowledge. The chapter closes with a preview of future directions 
that this line of research suggests. 
A ftamework for the neurobiology 0/ emotion and social 
cognition 
In less than a decade, the study of emotion has morphed 
from a neglected topic to one of the hot frontiers of cogni-
tive neuroscience. This reversal had several causes: the real-
ization that emotion dysfunction is a hallmark of essentially 
all psychiatric diseases, as well as a highly salient component 
of healthy function; the development of new techniques, 
notably functional imaging, that permit an unprecedented 
examination of its neural substrates; and the development 
of theoretical frameworks within which new hypotheses can 
be tested and data can be interpreted. Most important, these 
frameworks have sought to integrate emotion into the archi-
tecture of cognition in general, rescuing the field from its 
prior isolation. A key contribution to the rapid expansion of 
the field have been data from lesion studies, because they 
allow researchers to assign causal roles to neural structures. 
Lesion studies have demonstrated dissociations between per-
ception and emotion, recognition and emotion, emotion and 
feeling, and emotion and reason, and thus have outlined the 
neural systcms that process emotionally salient stimuli, 
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link them to emotional responses, modulate cognition by 
emotion, and generate emotional feelings. 
Despite the deluge of recent data, our understanding of 
emotion is confused. Different investigators use terms with 
different meanings, and researchers in diffcrent disciplines 
often find it difficult to understand one another. The reasons 
for this difficulty are some of thc same reasons that make 
the study of cognition in general difficult, but they are more 
acute in the study of emotion. They arise from our prethe-
orctical beliefS about emotions and feelings. Everyone 
believes that people have emotions, just as they believe that 
people have thoughts. But when we start taking apart people 
and investigating the internal mechanisms required for such 
attributions, we necessarily lose the person we started with. 
Does it make sense to attribute emotions (or thoughts) to 
parts of our bodies, including our brains? It probably makes 
no more sense to attribute an emotion to my stomach, my 
adrenal glands, or my amygdala than it does to attribute a 
visual percept to my visual cortices. Processes occurring in 
these structures are constituents of what makes a whole 
person have an emotion or a visual percept, but thcy are not 
to be confused synecdochically with the organism of which 
they are a part. Let me reiterate this, as it should be an 
obvious point. Autonomic responses, neuronal activity in the 
amygdala or in any other isolated -brain region, are never 
identical with emotions, because emotions depend on a 
complex, multidimensional pattern of concerted processes 
occurring in many places at various points in time. 'What is 
needed is an account of emotional and social information 
processing that describes the constituent internal processes 
and the roles that they play. 
What, then, is a starting framework within which we can 
investigate emotions? It is useful to draw on three different 
theories of emotion here (there are others that are relevant, 
but these three serve as a starting point). One theory, in 
line both '-Vi.th an evolutionary approach to emotion and 
aspects of appraisal theory, concerns the domain of infor-
mation that specifies emotion processing. In short, emotions 
concern, or derive from, information that is of direct 
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relevance to the homeostasis and survival of an organism 
(Darwin, 18721l965; Fr~jda, 1986; Damasio, 1994), that is, 
the significance that the situation has for the organism, both 
in terms of its immediate impact and in terms of the organ-
ism's plans and goals in responding to the situation 
1991). Fear and disgust are obvious examples of such emo-
tions. The notion of homeostasis and survival needs to be 
extended to the social world to account for social emotions, 
such as shame, guilt, or embarrassment, that regulate social 
behavior in groups. Emotions thus pertain to the value of 
a stimulus or of a behavior-value to the organism's own 
survival, or to the survival of one's offspring or relatives, or 
to a larger social group. 
This first point, the domain specificity of emotional infor-
mation, tells us what distinguishes emotion processing from 
information processing in gcncral, but leaves open two 
further questions: How broadly should we construe this 
domain, and how is such specificity implemented? In regard 
to the first question, the domain ineludes social and basic 
emotions, but also states such as pain, hunger, and any other 
information that has a bearing on survival. Is this too broad? 
Philosophers worry about such distinctions, but for the 
present, we as neuroscientists can simply acknowledge that 
indeed, the processing of emotions should (and, as it turns 
out, does) share mechanisms in common with the process-
ing of thirst, hunger, pain, sex, and any other category of 
information that motivates behavior (Panksepp, 1998; Rolls, 
1999). In regard to the second question, the implementation 
of value-laden information, an answer will require informa-
tion about the perceptual properties of a stimulus to be 
associated with information about the state of the organ-
ism perceiving that stimulus. Such information about the 
orgarlism could be sensory (somatosensory in a broad 
sense, meaning information about the impact that the 
stimulus has on homeostasis) or motor (information about 
the action plans triggered by the stimulus). This brings us to 
the remaining two of the three emotion theories. 
The first emotion theory, then, acknowledges that 
emotion is domain-specific and relates to the 
value that a stimulus has for an organism in a broad sense. 
The second emotion theory of relevance here concerns the 
cause-and-effect architecture of behavior, bodily states, and 
central states. Readers will be familiar with the theories of 
William James, Walter Cannon, and later thinkers that 
debated the primacy of bodily states (James, 1884; Cannon, 
1927). Arc we afraid first, and then we run away from the 
or do we have an emotional bodily response to the bear 
first, whose perception in turn constitutes our feeling afraid? 
This debate has been very muddled, for at least hvo reasons: 
the failure to distinguish emotions from feelings, and the 
ubiquitous tendency for a single causal scheme. 
It is useful to conceive of emotions as central states that 
are only dispositionally linked to certain physiological states 
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of the body, or certain behaviors, or certain feelings of which 
we are aware. An emotion is thus a neural state (or, better, 
a collection of processes) that operates in a domain-specific 
manner on information. However, the mechanism behind 
assigning value to such information depends on an organ-
ism's reactive and proactive response to the stimulus. The 
proactive component prepares the organism for action, and 
the reactive component reflects the response to a stimulus. 
It is the coordinated web of action preparations, stimulus 
responses, and an internal mapping of these that 
constitutes a central emotional state. Viewed this way, an 
emotion is neither cause nor consequence of a physiological 
response; it emerges in parallel with an organism's inter-
action with its environment, in parallel with physiological 
response, and in parallel with feeling. Behavior, physiological 
response, and feeling all causally affect one and 
none of them in isolation is co-extensive with the emotion, 
although we certainly use observations of them to infer an 
emotional state. 
The third cmotion theory to be considered here is the set 
of theories concerning appraisaL The issue under debate is 
the extent to which an emotion (or a social behavior) can 
ensue automatically and with only a coarse evaluation of a 
stimulus (Zajonc, 1980), or whether an emotion requires 
more elaborate cognitive appraisal of the significance that 
the stimulus has for an organism and of the behaviors appro-
priate to maximizing an adaptive response (Scherer, 1988; 
Lazarus, 1991). As with the James-Cannon debate, the 
answer here is, both. There is good evidence that some 
stimuli trigger emotional responses very rapidly and in the 
absence of conscious awareness, but also that elaborate cog-
nitive processing ,md evaluation play key roles, for instance 
in emotion regulation. To some extent these components 
may occur on different temporal scales. 
The findings from cognitive neuroscience corroborate the 
three points made earlier: emotional and social information 
processing is domain-specific, pertaining to maintenance of 
homeostasis in a changing and interactive environment; it 
unfolds in a complex, iterative way over time that involves 
perception, response, and feeling; and it draws on both rel-
atively fast and coarse perceptual processing and more 
complex cognitive appraisals. Emotional and social infor-
mation processing includes multiple perceptual routes, 
iterative feedback between emotion responses and their rep-
resentation, and extensive regulation at several levels 
(Adolphs, 2002; 73.1). These multiple perceptual 
routes result in information processing that is temporally 
dispersed. The dispersion in time in turn drives emotional 
responses that also occur on multiple temporal scales: some 
are rapid and relatively automatic, others require extensive 
evaluation of the stimulus and are often volitionally modu-
lated. Responses on different time scales interact, as shown 
clearly in some of the most popular paradigms for studying 
", 
Self-Regulation 
FIGURE 73.1 Processes that contribute to emotional and social 
information processing. Shown are some of the routes by which 
socially relevant information guides social behavior. Several fea-
tures are in1portant to note. There are multiple information pro-
cessing streams that differ in the extent to which they recruit 
emotions, in the extent to which they are available for conscious 
awareness and control, and in thcir speed and elaboration. The 
causal relations among these processing components arc complex 
emotions. For instance, emotional modulation of the startle 
reflex shows such an interaction: the startle reflex itself is 
extremely rapid and automatic, but it is modulated by the 
valence of visual stimuli via a pathway involving projections 
from the amygdala to the nucleus reticularis pars caudalis, 
as well as by cognitive evaluation of stimuli. 
Emotional responses to stimuli in turn are represented 
centrally, and are themselves modulated continuously. The 
emotional information that is processed thus varies in 
time, as does the emotional response, and the feeling of 
the emotion. The subsequent sections of this chapter 
review what we know about the contribution made by a 
specific structure, the amygdala, to these processes, with 
an emphasis on findings gleaned from lesion studies. All of 
the points made in this introductory discussion will turn 
out to be relevant for understanding what the amygdala 
and include extensive feedback (not shown). There are also notable 
metacognitive influences: adult humans stand out in the ability to 
regulate their social behavior based on awareness and effort (arrows 
indicating Self-Regulation and Reappraisal). This schematic 
summarizes an overall information processing architecture that 
includes many more structures than are discussed in the chapter. 
(Reproduced from Adolphs, 2003.) 
does as it participates m processing emotionally relevant 
information. 
Ear!:J perception if social!), relevant stimuli 
Certain features of stimuli, such as certain facial configura-
tions that signal emotions, can be processed rapidly, in part 
by subcortical mechanisms. For instance, processing of sub-
liminally presented facial expressions of fear activates the 
amygdala (Whalen et aL, 1998), possibly reflecting the oper-
ation of a circuit from the superior colliculus (SC) to the 
amygdala via the pulvinar thalamus. This interpretation is 
in line with functional imaging studies showing correlated 
activation of the SC, the pulvinar thalamus, and the amyg-
dala in response to subliminally presented facial expressions 
that had been associated with an aversive stimulus (Morris, 
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Ohman, and Dolan, 1999), a pattern of activation that was 
recently replicated in a subject with blindsight when dis-
criminating emotional f~iCial expressions in the blind visual 
field (Morris et al., 200 I). 
Regions of nonprimary sensory cortices already appear to 
be relatively specialized to process certain socially relevant 
attributes of stimuli. The evidence is best in regard to faces, 
for which higher-order visual cortices can be regarded as an 
assembly of modules that process distinct attributes, as borne 
out by a variety of lesion studies, scalp and intracranial 
recordings, and a rapidly growing list of functional imaging 
studies. The data point to the fusiform gyrus in processing 
the structural, static properties of faces, which are reliable 
indicators of personal identity, and to regions more anterior 
and dorsal in the temporal lobe (such as the superior tem-
poral gyrus and SC) in processing information about the 
changeable configurations of faces, such as facial expres-
eye movements, and mouth movements (McCarthy, 
1999; Haxby, Hoffman, and Gobbini, 2000). Activation 
along the superior temporal sulcus (STS) and superior tem-
poral gyrus (STG) has been found when subjects view stimuli 
depicting biological motion, such as eye gaze shifts, mouth 
movements, and point-light displays of whole-body biologi-
cal motion, and more abstract movements of geometric 
shapes, likely reflecting the role of this region in processing 
biological motion information on the basis of which we 
make social attributions. Processing in this region may draw 
on both dorsal and ventral visual streams in integrating 
shape and motion information, and it may reflect a com-
parison of the observed action with the viewer's simulation 
of it. The fusiform gyrus, the STG, and other, less-well-
specified regions of occipita temporal cortex could thus 
be thought of as an interconnected system of regions that 
together construct a spatially distributed perceptual repre-
sentation of different aspects of the face. There is good 
evidence that activation in all of these regions can be 
modulated by attention (Vuilleumier et al., 2001) and by the 
context in which the visual social signal appears (Pelphrey 
et aI., 2003; Wicker et al., 2003). 
An important recent lesion study showed that the amyg-
dala is also critical to mediate visual attention. When words 
are flashed visually in a rapid serial stream, there is a well-
known phenomenon called the attentional blink: when subjects 
are asked to identifY a particular word that appears in the 
stream, their ability to detect a subsequent word within a 
short time window after the initially identified one is severely 
impaired. However, when the subsequent word to be 
detected is highly emotional, it can be detected even when 
it falls within the attentional blink window. Apparently, the 
initial allocation of attention to a target compromises sub· 
jects' ability to detect an immediately subsequent one, but 
emotional salience provides an independent boost that can 
override this blink-a boost that depends on the amygdala. 
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Lesions of the amygdala do not impair the attentional blink 
itself but the ability of emotion to override it (Anderson and 
Phelps, 200 I). The finding is in line with the idea that the 
amygdala modulates the access of visual information to sub-
sequent cognitive processing on the basis of the emotional 
value of the information. 
The above anatomical investigations are complemented 
by data on the timing of face-processing components. 
Studies using event-related potentials (ERPs) and magne-
toencephalography (MEG) show that some coarse catego-
rization, such as sex and emotion categorization, can occur 
at latencies as short as 100 ms. Peak activity related to face-
specific processing near the fusiform gyrus is seen around 
170-200 ms (Allison et al., 1994). Although the construction 
of a detailed structural representation of the face thus seems 
to require about 170 ms, it appears that some rapid, coarse 
categorization can occur with substantially shorter latencies, 
presumably indicating coarse perceptual routes parallel to a 
full structural encoding of the stimulus. Perception of emo-
tionally and socially relevant stimuli should be seen as an 
ongoing process extended in time, driven both by a collec-
tion of bottom-up processes and by top-down modulation. 
The amygdala's role in processing emotional and social 
irifOrmation 
Although it is difficult to define exactly what constitutes 
higher-level processing, there are at least three domains that 
probably qualifY: multistep processing that involves volition, 
thinking about other people's minds, and awareness of one's 
feelings. There is clear evidence that emotional and social 
information conu:ibutes to decision making, reasoning, and 
other processes that can be influenced volition ally. By defi-
nition, social information processing also includes abilities by 
which we attribute mental states (such as goals, intentions, 
and emotions) to other people, dubbed theory of mind. 
Regions in prefrontal cortex, including ventral and medial 
prefrontal and cingulate cortex, participate in these 
processes. Structures that function to construct components 
of a self model, such as visceral and somatic sensory cor-
tices in parietal lobe and insula, participate in these processes 
as well and are critical for feeling an emotion (Adolphs, 
2003a). 
The amygdala's role in these higher processes is quite 
unclear. Although there have been reports of impaired deci-
sion making (Bechara et al., 1999) or theory-of-mind abili-
ties (Stone et a!., 2003) in subjects with bilateral amygdala 
damage, it is plausible to assign the impairments in those 
cases to a defect in more basic emotional information pro-
cessing rather than specific to the higher function (Adolphs, 
2003a). There is also evidence from functional imaging 
studies that volitional modulation of emotion modulates acti-
vation of the amygdala (Ochsner et al., 2002; Schaefer et al., 
2002), but this does not show (hat the amygdala sub-
serves volitional emotional processing, merely that it can be 
influenced by such processing. Finally, there is no evidence to 
suggest that the amygdala itself is critical for f(~eling emotions 
(Adolphs, 1999; Anderson and Phelps, 2002). 
The evidence thus far points to a role for the amygdala in 
processing information at a level somewhat "higher" than 
basic perception but "below" the level of explicit reasoning 
and thinking about social information. This picture is 
extremely vague, but it serves to roughly locate the contri-
bution that the amygdala makes at the interlace of bottom-
up perceptual processing and a whole host of other cognitive 
processes. '\That the amygdala does is not like what a reflex 
does (although it modulates nor is it like thinking 
(although it modulates our thoughts), but rather is something 
more ubiquitous that pervades the organization of thought 
and behavior at all levels. 
RECOGNIZING EMOTION FROM FACES The first definitive 
demonstration that the human amygdala plays a critical role 
in recognizing emotion came from two patients with bilat-
eral to the amygdala (Adolphs et al., I Young 
et al., 1995). Both patients had largely normal visuopereep-
FIGCRE. 73.2 of S.M.046. Shmvn at top left is a 
three-dimensional reconstruction of 8.M.'s brain li'om lvIR 
showing' the planes of section of the other cuts. The ";Tn~,,ct>'H'~ 
region of low signal in the anteromcdial lobe is due to 
tual function but were impaired at recognizing certain kinds 
of information from faces shown to them. In particulaJ; both 
showed an inability to recognize normally emotions from 
facial expressions; that is, they had an ernotion agnosia. 
The patient my colleagues and studied, S.M.046, had 
selective and complete bilateral amygdala damage due to 
Urbach-Wiethe disease (also known as lipoid proteinosis), a 
rare disorder of epithelial tissue caused by a muta-
tion in the extracellular matrix protein 1 gene (Hamada 
et aI., 2002). Patients with this disease show medial tempo-
ral lobe calcifications and atrophy in about 50% of eases 
1 In S.:~v1.046's case, the damage was confined 
to the amygdala and the very anterior portions of entorhi-
nal cortex (Tranel and Hyman, I figure Her lesion 
and her neuropsychological profile have remained stable 
over more than a decade of study (Adolphs and 
2000). Despite her normal ability to recognize sex, idenliry, 
and other ini()rmalion from S.M.046 is severely 
impaired in her ability to recognize certain emotions. The 
impairment is most notable fbr but includes to some 
extent emotions that are conceptually close to such 
as surprise and anger (Adolphs et al., 1994, 1995). Her 
dysfunction is clearly an agnosia, since S.M.046 is able to 
calcification and atrophy of tissue within the entire as 
well as anterior entorhinal cortex. The damage resulted from a rare 
Urbach-Wiethe disease. 
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FIGl;RE 73.3 role in processing fearful facial 
elqJressions. 4ft, recognition of fear fbllowing bilateral 
amygdala damage. Shown are data from S.M.046 on the 
llllCll',ll y of emotions shown in facial expressions. Subjects were 
shown morphs of prototypical facial of emotions and 
asked to rate the intensity of eaeh of the six basic emotions sig-
naled these stimuli. The x-axis shows the face stimnli and the]-
axis shows the correlation of S.M.046's ratings with normal 
discriminate normally even very faint morphs of the same 
emotions that she hiiled to (Adolphs and Tram:), 
2000). Moreover, she is able to use the wordjimr appropri-
ately in conversation, and is able to generate considerable 
conceptual knowledge about that emotion. vVhen asked to 
rate the intensity of emotion signaled by a facial 
SJvL046 gave very abnormal ratings to 
fear (figure She also showed a converse 
when asked to draw facial expressions of emotions for which 
we supplied the name, she was able to draw all exeept fear 
et al., 1995). She thus showed a bidirectional 
disconnection between the concept of fear and the facial 
expressions that normally signal that emotion. 
While S.M.046's impairment is strikingly to fear, 
at least on certain other patients with bilateral U,,"'UQ'i-'.~ 
to the amygdala show in facial emotion ree-
that but typically encompass 
several emotions, often including but not limited to 
fear. In a of nine such patients, we found a pattern of 
impairments that extended across rating the intensity of 
multiple negative emotions, especially fear, angel~ and disgust 
(Adolphs, Tranel, et 1999; figure 13.'!) Other studies 
have pointed to disproportionate impairments in reeogniz-
EMOTION iu'lD SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE 
" 
" 
<> 
thus, values dose to 1 reflect normal recognition, whereas values 
dose to 0 reflect very Activation of the 
""'"leU''''' when normal viewed facial expressions. \Vhen 
normal subjects with intact werc shown morphs 
between and fearful cerebral blood flow 
within the of fear shown in 
ii'om Morris Cl aI., 1996 bv 
ing fear (Calder et Broks el a1., 1998), more subtle 
impairments in various emotions that depend on 
the particular task and analysis and Squire, 2001), 
or impairments that might be attributable to dilhculty of the 
task alone et a1., 2000; Adolphs, 
Data from functional imaging studies have helped to 
narrow down these possibilities. Although there was an 
initial flurry of findings showing amygdala activation in 
response to fearful facial expressions (Breiter et I 
Morris et aI., 1996), some of which arc still sup-
ported by more recent studies et al., 2001), those 
findings are now supplemented by others shmving that the 
amygdala is activated by multiple emotional expressions 
(Blair et al., 1999; et aI., 2002), but differentially so. It 
does not look as if the amygdala is activated by 
expressions of all emotions or that its activation can be 
explained merely by the of the task required. On 
the other hand, it remains unclear exactly what emotion 
it might be specialized to process. 
\Ve arc thus faced with a key question: How domain-
specific is processing in the amygdala? As in some regions of 
temporal extrastriate cortex, responses within the amygdala 
seem disproportionate for social visual information such as 
4 
surprise 
3 
2 
1 
happy afraid angry sad 
surprised disgusted 
FIGL'RE 73.4 Impaired recognition of multiple negative emotions 
in nine subjects "with bilateral amygdala damage. On the same task 
73.3, a group of nine subjects with bilateral amygdala 
showed variable impairments across not fear but 
also other vale need emotions, compared to eithcr 
brain-damaged or normal controls. Each of the three graphs shows 
data for normal controls, brain-damaged controls, and 
with amygdala damage. The x- and )!-axes represent tbe labels OIl 
which faces arc rated and the face stimuli, respectively. The gray 
scale codes the intensity they assigned to the lace on that emotion 
labeL 
£1.ces, and thc lesion studies certainly point to a role in rec-
ognizing only certain negatively valenced cmotions, perhaps 
especially fear; but clearly its role is not restricted entirely to 
processing information about fcar: There arc at least three 
possibilities here: the amygdala is specialized to process a 
particular basic emotion, fear; (2) the amygdala processes a 
region of t,<,vo-dimensional affect spacc, namely, those emo-
tions that are both negatively valenced and highly arousing; 
and the amygdala processes a particular ecological cate-
gory of emotions, fi)r instance those related to threat and 
danger (Adolphs, Tranel, et aL, 1999; Adolphs, 2002), those 
requiring the resolution of ambiguity (Whalen, 1999), or 
perhaps those requiring a mapping of an observed emo-
tional state onto a dillerent emotion in the perceiver 
anger elicits fear, not anger). 
There are several further considerations in interpreting 
the data thus far. The lesion srudies are complicated by the 
fact that diITerent stimuli, different tasks, and diflerent analy-
ses have often been used. The patients presem many difler-
ences both in terms of the details of their Icsions and 
in terms of the cognitive background within which the 
amygdala damage results in impaired emotion processing. 
Most of the patients have damage also to extra-amygdalar 
structures that is often quite substantiaL Even within the 
amygdala, the damage can vary, and studies have not 
attempted to distinguish betwecn damage in different amyg-
dala nuelei. These difficulties aside, it nonetheless seems pos-
sible to extract from the different studies a common pattern 
of disproportionately impaired recognition of only certain 
emotions, perhaps those that are both negatively valenced 
and of high arousal, such as fear. Is this because fearful facial 
expressions signal a particular type of information whose 
processing depends on the integrity of the amygdala? Or is 
processing of fear-related information distinguished in some 
other ways unrelated to emotion? These are tricky questions 
to which we as yet do not have definitive answers. There is, 
for instance, the possibility that certain tasks ask subjects to 
categorizc fear at a level that is subordinate to the level of 
categorization required for happincss or sadness (which 
could be thought of as prototypes of the more superordinate 
categories "happy" ane! "unhappy"). It might be that fear is 
simply more confusable with certain emotions, like surprise 
and anger, than happiness is confusable with any emotion 
(Adolphs, In support of such a possibility, we 
described a patient with extensive bilateral temporal lobc 
damage, including damage to the amygdala, who essentially 
rccognizee! only nYo superordinate emotion categories, 
happy and unhappy, and who miselassified lc.ar into the 
happy category (Adolphs, Tranel, and Damasio, 2003). 
Future srudies will need to be very careful in controlling for 
these factors. 
A natural follow-up to the findings just presentcd is the 
specificity of the impairment for faces. We examined this 
issue by showing subjects social scenes under two conditions: 
in one condition the scenes contained emotional facial 
expressions, in the second the faces were erased in the scenes. 
:'\ot surprisingly, normal ane! brain-damaged controls found 
it easier to recognize the emotion from scenes when they 
contained emotional expressions than when the expressions 
had been erased. contrast, subjects with amygdala 
damage showed no such advantage. In they were much 
worse at reeoguizing emotions from scenes when the scenes 
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FIGURE 73.5 Recognition of emotion from social scenes is dis-
proportionately severe when the scenes contain facial expressions. 
(a) Subjects with either unilateral or bilateral amygdala damage 
were more impaired in recognizing negatively valenced emotions 
from complex visual scenes only when those scenes contained facial 
eX))re:ssicms. (b) Wilen faces in the scenes were erased, the subjects' 
performances became normal. (e) Accuracy in recognizing basic 
emotions from these stimuli: whereas normal controls (NC) and 
brain-damaged eontrols (BDC) always performed mueh better on 
the second set of stimuli, with the faces present, subjects with either 
contained faces than when they did not (Adolphs and 
Tranel, 2003; figure Furthermore, there was even an 
indication that subjects with bilateral amygdala damage 
were better than normals in recognizing emotions from 
scenes when faces had been erased. Taken together, these 
findings emphasize the importance of the face in signaling 
emotional information, and the importance of the amygdala 
in processing precisely that information. Subjects with amyg-
dala damage are sensitive to emotion signaled by the face 
but are unable to use it normally in order to recognize the 
emotion; when the face is removed, however, they are able 
to use information normally from context, body posture, or 
other cues in ordcr to judge the emotion. 
SOCIAL J UDGME:TI FROM FACES What is the significance of 
the emotion recognition impairment described in the previ-
ous section for real-life behavior? It is worth noting that we 
do not typically use information from faces solely to deter-
mine another person's emotional state, but rather to make 
social judgments regarding the other person's intentions 
and dispositions and to guide our own behavior toward 
them. \Ve examined this issue by asking subjects to judge the 
approachability and trustworthiness of unfamiliar faces. 
These faces showed people in natural poses, not different 
strong emotional expressions (the expressions were neutral 
or smiling). We found a specific impairment in subjects with 
bilateral amygdala damage: whereas they judged approach-
able- and trustworthy-looking people normally, they failed to 
judge unapproachability and untrustvvorthiness (Adolphs, 
Tranel, and Damasio, 1998). The impairment consisted of 
two distinct components: first, subjects with bilateral amyg-
dala damage exhibited an overall positive bias in judging 
everyone to look more trustworthy and approachable than 
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unilateral left (L), right (R), or bilateral (hi) amygdala damage 
showed the inverse pattern of performance specifically for nega-
tively valenced emotions. 'What was even more surprising, some 
subjects ",-ith bilateral amygdala were severely impaired in 
recognizing scenes when the scenes contained facial expressions, 
but actually performed better than controls when faces had been 
erased, possibly suggesting that they learn to partly compensate for 
their inlpaired recognition of emotion from faces by developing 
greater sensitivity to social cues other than faces. 
normally judged; second, they were able to rank-order very 
trustworthy- or approachable-looking people normally but 
failed to rank-order individuals who were normally judged 
to look untrusn-vorthy or unapproachable 73.6). This 
impairment extends the impaired recognition of basic emo-
tions we have described to more complex social judgments. 
Possibly the two sets of impairments are related: recognition 
of facial expressions may be impaired disproportionately for 
those emotions that signal threat or danger in the environ-
ment in general, and social judgment may be impaired in 
regard to threat or danger in the social environment in par-
ticular. The impaired ability to judge untrustworthiness 
is also consistent with the real-life behavior of these sub-
jects, which often features an overly trusting and friendly 
personality. 
This finding from lesion studies has been corroborated by 
functional imaging studies. A recent study showed that acti-
vation within the amygdala correlated with the degree of 
judged untrustworthiness of the face that was shown to sub-
jects (Winston et al., 2002). Moreover, this correlation held, 
even when other factors such as expression, sex, ethnicity; 
and eye gaze were controlled for. There is thus something 
about the physiognomy of the face on the basis of which we 
normally judge trustworthiness, and the amygdala is one 
structure mediating such judgments. 
Just as difficult questions arose in regard to the amygdala's 
specificity for processing there are analogous (broader) 
questions concerning its role in processing domain-specific 
social information. \Ve followed up on the experiments 
described in the preceding section by investigating the 
preferences that subjects exhibit for nonsocial stimuli, such 
as pictures of landscapes. To our surprise, we found that 
subjects ",ith bilateral amygdala damage showed the same 
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FIGURE 73.6 The amygdala in social judgments of trustworthi-
ness. Bilateral damage to the amygdala (BrUT) selectively impairs 
the ability to judge untrustworthiness from faces, whereas unilat-
eral damage (R, L), or brain damage elsewhere (BDC) does not. 
inability to judge aversive nonsocial stimuli: they judged pic-
tures of landscapes, nonsense drawings, colored spheres, and 
colored Mondrians to be abnormally positive when asked 
how much they liked them (Adolphs and Tranel, 1999b). It 
thus appears as though bilateral damage to the amygdala 
impairs an ability to judge aversive, dangerous, or in some 
way undesirable stimuli in a manner that is not completely 
domain-specific. Similar observations have been made in 
nonhuman primates following experimentally introduced 
amygdala lesions (Emery et al., 200 I). 
RECOGNIZING EMOTION FROM AUDITORY STIMULI By com-
parison to the amygdala'S role in recognizing emotions from 
faces, its role in recognition of emotion from auditory stimuli 
is very unclear. This is surprising. Given the multimodal 
nature of sensory inputs to the amygdala, one would cer-
tainly expect impairments in emotion processing to be par-
allel across sensory modalities. A small number of functional 
imaging studies have reported activation of the amygdala to 
prosodic or other emotional auditory stimuli (Phillips et al., 
1998), although some have reported deactivation of the 
amygdala instead (Morris, Scott, and Dolan, 1999). Some 
lesion studies have found impaired ability to recognize fear 
from auditory stimuli following bilateral amygdala damage 
(Scott et aL, 1997), whereas others have not (Anderson and 
Phelps, 1998; Adolphs and Tranel, 1999a). 
We investigated the role of the amygdala in recognizing 
emotion from prosody and found no significant impairment 
following bilateral amygdala damage (Adolphs and Tranel, 
1999a). Curiously, however, we did find some evidence 
of variable impairment following temporal lobectomy 
(Adolphs, Tranel, and Damasio, 2(01). A particularly unex-
pected finding was of a disproportionate impairment in rec-
ognizing emotions from faces or from prosody following left 
CTR NORM BILAT R L CTR 
The 1:\"10 graphs plot mean ratings of untrustworthiness assigned 
by subjects to 50 faces that are normally rated the most untrust-
worthy looking (left, normative ratings, NOR.'\1) and to 50 faces 
normally rated the most trustworthy looking (right). 
or right amygdala damage, respectively (Adolphs, Tranel, 
and Damasio, 20(2). Although this finding suggests differ-
ent roles for the left and the right amygdala in processing 
emotional and social information from certain sensory 
modalities, it is important to keep in mind that the lesions of 
the patients in this study (patients with epilepsy who had 
undergone a temporal lobectomy) included not only unilat-
eral amygdala lesions but also lesions in surrounding cortex 
and other structures in the anteromedial temporal lobe. 
The evidence for the amygdala's role in recognizing 
emotion from nonprosodic auditory stimuli (e.g., screams, 
growls, sirens) is more encouraf,ring. Some lesion studies, 
including unpublished findings with our patient S.M.046, 
have pointed to such a role (Scott et al., 1997). 
RECOGNIZING EMOTION FROM LEXICAL h'FORMATION 
Although some functional imaging studies have found amyg-
dala activation to lexical emotional stimuli (Isenberg et al., 
1999; Phelps et al., 200 I; Hamann and Mao, 2(02), lesion 
studies have generally suggested that the amygdala is not 
essential for recognizing or judging emotional and social 
information from explicit, lexical stimuli such as stories. Our 
studies with S.M.046 are a good case in point: S.M.046 can 
label emotions from scenarios presented in stories, and she 
can retrieve considerable declarative knowledge about all 
emotions, including fear. 
There however, an interesting wrinkle to this story. 
S.M.046 does not know that some unpleasant emotions are 
arousing! In order to probe the categories of emotions whose 
recognition is impaired, we asked subjects to rate emotional 
stimuli not in terms of their intensity on basic emotions, as 
done in the studies cited earlier, but in terms of their valence 
(pleasantness or unpleasantness) and arousal. Normal 
subjects judge emotions such as fear and anger to be 
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both unpleasant and highly arousing. S.M.046, by contrast, 
judged them to be unpleasant but of low arousal (Adolphs, 
Russell, and Tranel, 1999). This impairment in recognizing 
arousal from unpleasant emotions held across labels for the 
emotions, stories depicting emotions, and facial expressions 
of emotions, thus reflecting impaired conceptual knowledge 
in general, irrespective of the nature of the stimulus. For 
instance, when told a story about someone driving a car 
down a steep mountain road who had lost the brakes, 
she correctly recognized that the situation would be very 
unpleasant, but also gave the highly abnormal judgment that 
it would make one feel sleepy and relaxed. The impairment 
was especially since S.M.046 was able to judge 
arousal normally from positive emotions. 
vVe found a similar impairment in two other subjects who, 
like S.M.046, had bilateral amygdala damage that was sus-
tained relatively early in life. However, three subjects with 
complete bilateral amygdala damage due to encephalitis sus-
tained in adulthood showed no such impairment (Adolphs 
et al., 1997; figure 73.7). How can we reconcile these 
findings? Our explanation is that normal acquisition of 
conceptual knowledge of certain emotions depends on the 
integrity of the amygdala during development. Bilateral 
amygdala damage would preclude normal emotional arousal 
responses to stimuli signaling fear or anger: the absence of 
such responses, as well as of cognitive modulation, explains 
the online impairment in recognizing fear from facial 
expressions in such patients. But they would still know, as a 
declarative fact, what fear is, and how arousing it should be, 
provided they have experienced such arousal in the past. 
Developmental damage to the amygdala would prevent 
such knowledge from arising normally, with the observed 
impaired knowledge that fear and anger are arousing 
emotions. This developmental consequence is probably 
analogous to the consequences of developmental frontal 
lobe damage: like patients with amygdala damage, they 
are impaired in their ability to trigger normal emotional 
responses to stimuli during development, and as in patients 
with developmental damage to the amygdala but not as in 
patients with adult-onset damage to either amygdala or 
prefrontal cortex, this translates into an impaired concept of 
some aspects of emotional or social knowledge. 
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL RESPONSES IN THE HUl'vlA"I AMYG-
DALA Single-unit recordings from the monkey amygdala 
have found neurons whose responses are modulated by the 
emotional significance of stimuli (Rolls, 1999). Of note, this 
modulation can be independent of the perceptual proper-
ties of the stimulus. For instance, the very same stimulus can 
evoke differential amygdala activity, depending on its prior 
association with reward or punishment (Nishijo, Ono, and 
Nishino, 1988). We have recorded field potentials and single-
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unit activity from the amygdala of neurosurgical patients 
who were undergoing epilepsy monitoring. As in the animal 
studies, we found neurons whose responses were selectively 
modulated by the emotion category of stimuli. In our case, 
these were complex visual stimuli, and we checked to be sure 
that responses could not be attributed to factors such as 
differences in luminance or color composition of the 
categories. The responses we found showed an increase in 
activity that was selective for aversive stimuli-pictures of 
mutilation, threat, and war (Oya et al., 2002; figure 73.8). 
An interesting additional finding was the suggestion of a 
differential electrophysiological signature (power at dif-
ferent frequency bands), depending on whether the images 
showed bodily injury to people or disgusting items (e.g., 
dirty toilets, cockroaches). These latter findings raise the 
intriguing possibility that different neurons within the 
amygdala, or possibly even the same neurons participating 
in a different nenvork, can encode different aspects of 
emotional information. We have ohtained sin1ilar findings 
also when patients were presented with olfactory stimuli: 
as for the visual stimuli, the neurons responded selectively 
by increasing their firing rates to unpleasant olfactory 
stimuli. 
Summary 
\Ve can now tie some of these diverse strands together. The 
human amygdala appears to be important both for the 
acquisition and for the online processing of emotional 
stimuli. Its role is disproportionate for a particular category 
of emotional information, possibly that pertaining to evalu-
ating potential threat in the environment. Its processing 
encompasses both the elicitation of emotional responses in 
the body and changes in other cognitive processes, such as 
attention and memory. vVhen these effects occur online, as 
an emotional stimulus is processed, they also contribute to 
the acquisition of certain components of concepts of emo-
tions, namely, those components of knowledge dependent 
on prior emotional responses. This is why damage to the 
amygdala early in life, as we saw in the case of S.M.046, 
compromises not only emotional responses and recogni-
tion of emotional stimuli, but also ahstract knowledge of 
particular aspects of emotion concepts, specifically that 
unpleasant emotions can be arousing, an attribute that is 
particularly pertinent for the emotions fear and anger. 
I have highlighted the amygdala as a structure that 
mediates between perceptual representations of stimuli and 
the modulation of cognition, hut the amygdala should be 
thought of as only one component of a neural system. Other 
components with a related function include ventral and 
medial regions of the prefrontal cortex and the basal 
ganglia. In many studies these regions are coactivated, and 
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FIGURE 73.7 Developmental damage to the amygdala impairs 
knowledge of the arousal of unpleasant emotions. Patient S.M.04,6 
was impaired in her knowledge that negatively valenced emotions, 
especially fear and anger, are also highly arousing. The impairment 
was evident both for facial expressions of emotions (not shown) and 
in many ways their functions overlap. It remains an impor-
tant question, therefore, to describe the ways in which they 
differ. One hypothesis is that the amygdala and the ventral 
striatum subserve relatively rapid, automatic, and coarse 
emotional processing driven largely by features of the 
stimulus, and that sectors of the prefrontal cortex modulate 
such processing by providing information about the context 
in which the stimulus occurred and by introducing volitional 
effects on information processing. This scheme is probably 
too simple, because it is likely that amygdala and ventral 
striatum also participate in these latter functions~--indeed, 
there are data demonstrating that their activations can be 
modulated volitionally, perhaps via top-down influences 
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for lexical stimuli such as the words for the emotions and stories 
depicting emotions. Bars indicate means ± SD of responses by 
normal controls; circles indicate responses from S.M.O-i6. (See 
color plate 
from prefrontal cortex. Another reason the scheme is likely 
to be simplistic is that it does not account for the different 
roles that different amygdala nuclei will play. 
Ji'uture questions 
The findings reviewed in this chapter leave us with some 
important open questions (Adolphs, 2003b). Several of these 
questions return to issues we identified at the beginning of 
the chapter. To what extent is social information processing 
domain-specific, and to what extent does it draw on more 
general motivational and emotional processing? Where in 
the causal relations between processes do feelings come in? 
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FIGURE 73.8 recorded 
from the amygdala in response to visual stimuli. Time shown on 
the .1:'-axis (seconds) and the of the recorded response 
is shown on the Stimulus onset is indicated by 
What role does more extensive and volitional 
processing play 111 emotion and social information 
processing? 
The evidence reviewed clearly points to some domain 
specificity in the of socially relevant information: 
there arc brain mechanisms specialized to detect faces and 
process threat-related stimuli. But this observation still leaves 
open two possibilities: such specializations may reflect the 
operation of systems that are truly to process 
social information, or they may reflect thc fact that social 
stimuli make particular processing demands, which are, 
however; subservcd domain-general systems. The ques-
tion of domain specificity thus concerns the factors that are 
driving this specificity: are properties of the 
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ture that subserves the 
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of the neural al'chitec-
of such stimuli, or 
Although the amygdala does nor appear directly essential 
for feeling it likely plays an indirect role by trig-
gering components of emotional responses that can in turn 
be felL Pilot data fi'Ol1l our laboratory indicate t.hat S.M.046 
does not feel emotions when she views fl1m dips 
or listens to music, but she can provide relatively normal 
of feelings when abstract information or \'\-'hen 
instructed to lCel a certain \-vay. Thcsc together 
with the that patients with lesions of the amygdala 
endorse normal on scales of affect, 
make it likcly that the amygdala serves to link perceptnal 
representations of e.x:ternal stimuli to the modulation of 
cognition and behavior, and therefore can indirectly have 
an influence on the feelings such stimuli elicit. 
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